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ABSTRACT 
Terrorists exploit surprise in successful attacks; security forces are generally 
unaware of the source of these attacks. In today’s information age, terror threats 
may originate with transnational organizations or exploit the territory of failed, 
weak or neutral states.  
 Countering maritime terrorism by eliminating terrorists on land is the best 
solution; however, it may not be feasible, and if feasible could require many 
years. This thesis utilizes Game Theory to analyze various counterterrorism 
strategies, and infers how security forces could tilt the game of small boat terror 
attacks to their advantage.  
 Since Israel has immense experience in countering small boat terrorism, 
Israeli coastal defense is analyzed, examining how detection and identification 
enhance Maritime Space Transparency (MST), adapting Maritime Domain 
Awareness (MDA) to territorial sea.  
 Since MST needs to be maintained continuously in time and large spatial 
domains, the feasibility of utilizing Automatic Identification System (AIS), Inverse 
Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR) and electro-optical sensors on aerostats, and 
AIS and Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) from Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites to 
generate a Common Operating Picture (COP) is explored.  
 The optimum number of aerostats fitted with an appropriate sensor suite is 
calculated with multi-criteria optimization to provide more than 89% MST. The 
thesis concludes with recommendations, such as amending existing International 
Maritime Organization AIS fitment policy from size-based to role-based fitment.  
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A.  IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM  
The 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai, India's financial capital, drew 
widespread condemnation across the world. The attack killed more than 173 
people and wounded 308, and “for 62 hours, from the night of 26 November to 
the morning of 29 November, the city of Mumbai was held hostage to terror 
attacks.”1 Since 1993, Mumbai has witnessed many coordinated bomb 
explosions by terrorists; but the attack on 26 November 2008, wherein the 
attackers utilized the sea to infiltrate the country, was the first of its kind in India. 
 
Figure 1.   TAJ HOTEL IN MUMBAI UNDER ATTACK 
 
                                            
1  Namrata Goswami, "IDSA Comment - Mumbai Attacks: A Deadly Performance," Institute of 
Defense Studies and Analysis, December 05, 2008, 
http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/MumbaiAttacks_NGoswami_051208 (accessed 
January 26, 2010). 
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“It has now come to light from the interrogation of the arrested terrorist, 
Mohammad Ajmal Amir Iman, a resident of Faridkot village in Pakistan’s Punjab 
province, that 10 Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) men left Karachi harbor and rowed out 
to the Arabian Sea in the early morning of 23 November and later on hijacked a 
Porbandar-based fishing boat Kuber to reach Mumbai.”2 The infiltrators then split 
into smaller groups and attacked different locations in Mumbai, including hotels, 
railway stations, pubs and residential areas. Prior to these terror attacks, there 
had been many incidents of small boat terror attacks carried out worldwide by the 
Palestinians, LTTE and Al-Qaeda; but none of these incidents, though serious by 
themselves, caused mass casualties or destruction on the level of the Mumbai 
attacks.  
Countries like Israel and Sri Lanka have been combating these types of 
small boat terror attacks in their territorial sea for many years; historically, Israel 
has been the longest victim of such attacks.  
Historically, Israel’s main experience with maritime terrorism came 
in the 1970s. When, for the first time Palestinian terror 
organizations gained experience with and developed maritime 
terrorism tactics that are still relevant today.  Three out of the four 
major terrorist attacks in Israel in the 1970s were maritime 
infiltration attacks.3   
Although Israel has been a victim of small boat terrorism since 1970, the most 
devastating of these types of terror attacks prior to the Mumbai attacks, were 
those undertaken by Al-Qaeda against warships and merchantmen. 
Al-Qaeda’s most notable success in deploying terror technique was 
its devastating attack on the USS Cole (DDG 67) in Aden on 
October 12, 2000. The attack killed 17 sailors and injured 39 
others, leaving the vessel with a 40 by 60 foot hole in its port side; 
repairs to the vessel cost nearly $250 million. Two years later, on 
October 6, 2002, Al-Qaeda bombers in a small boat filled with 
                                            
2  Namrata Goswami, "IDSA Comment - Mumbai Attacks: A Deadly Performance." 
3. Akiva J. Lorenz, "The Threat of Maritime Terrorism to Israel," International Institute for 
Counterterrorism. September 24, 2007, 
http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/251/currentpage/6/Default.aspx (accessed February 
14, 2010). 
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explosives rammed the French tanker Limburg at Mukalla, as it was 
approaching the Ash Shihr Terminal off the Yemeni coast. This 
attack killed one crewmember and spilled 90,000 barrels of oil from 
the vessel’s 397,000-barrel cargo.4 
These small boat terror attacks by Al Qaeda, were in clear emulation of the 
tactics developed by the LTTE, which involved ramming a boat laden with 
explosives into selected maritime targets. It is apparent that in the recent past, 
terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda have very successfully adapted the proven 
attack methods of LTTE, on a couple of incidents against the U.S. and its allies.      
In today’s information age, the terrorists’ transnational network enables 
them to share the operational tactics of contemporary, proven attack methods, 
and also encourages other terrorist organizations to adopt such methods. Thus, 
the possibility of small boat terror attacks, similar to the 2008 Mumbai terror 
attacks, in the future and against other countries, especially those combating 
terrorism, cannot be ignored.  
B.  PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
Countering maritime terrorism by eliminating terrorists on land is 
unquestionably the best solution; however, this may not always be feasible and if 
feasible could require many years. The purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to 
suggest an implementable solution to counter the threat of small boat terrorism in 
territorial sea by utilizing existing theories and technologies, even if the efforts on 
land have not effectively countered the terrorist base camps. The scope of the 
thesis has been restricted to the territorial sea, as it is only in these waters that a 
state exercises sovereign jurisdiction. This is in accordance with the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which states, “the sovereignty of a  
 
 
                                            
4  John C. K. Daly, "Terrorism and Piracy: The Dual Threat to Maritime Shipping," Global 
Terrorism Analysis, August 15, 2008, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/Terrorism and 
Piracy The Dual Threat to Maritime Shipping - The Jamestown Foundation.mht (accessed 
February 07, 2010). 
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coastal state extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters, and in the 
case of an archipelagic state, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, 
described as the territorial sea.”5    
C.  RESEARCH QUESTION 
Terrorists exploit surprise to ensure the success of a terror attack. Target 
security forces are generally unaware of the terror attacks’ “who, where and 
when;” leading to the question: can small boat terror attacks in territorial sea be 
effectively countered?  The surprise factor ensures information advantage to the 
terrorists for negating the force advantage of unsuspecting security forces. 
Therefore, to successfully counter small boat terrorism in territorial sea, security 
forces have to overcome terrorists’ information asymmetric advantage.  
D. HYPOTHESES 
Navies worldwide have utilized and are utilizing Maritime Domain 
Awareness (MDA), which is all about collecting and amalgamating information 
from various sources into a Common Operating Picture (COP), for generating 
actionable intelligence.  MDA could, therefore, be adapted for the territorial sea, 
reducing information asymmetry between terrorists and maritime security forces. 
This would also provide necessary transparency in the desired maritime space, 
to interdict small boats heading for terror attacks in these waters.  Certain 
analysts do not agree with this hypothesis and articulate alternative hypotheses 
some of which call for pre-emptive or retaliatory strikes against terrorist base 
camps.   
                                            
5  "United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea - Part II," United Nations web sites, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part2.htm (accessed March 01, 
2010). 
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E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Conceptual Literature 
The existing theories on counterterrorism have been organized into two 
categories of offensive and protective philosophies. These have been tabulated 
below: 
Table 1.   OFFENSIVE AND PROTECTIVE PHILOSOPHIES  
 
                                            
6  U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,  https://www.cia.gov/news-information/cia-
the-war-on-terrorism/Counter_Terrorism_Strategy.pdf. 
7  Dana Goward, "Maritime Domain Awareness -- The Whole is Greater than the Sum of its," 
U.S. Coast Guard, April 20, 2009, http://www.uscg.mil/comdt/blog/2009/04/maritime-domain-
awareness-whole-is.asp (accessed March 02, 2010). 
8  "DHS' Strategy and Plans to Counter Small Vessel," Department of Homeland Security 
Office of Inspector General, September 2009, http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_09-
100_Sep09.pdf (accessed March 02, 2010). 
9  Akiva J. Lorenz, "The Threat of Maritime Terrorism to Israel." 
10  Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P Zagorcheva, "Deterring Terrorism: It Can be Done," 
International Security 3, no. 3, Winter 2005/06, 87. 
Offensive Protective 
1. Pre-emptive strikes:  
- U.S. National Strategy for combating 
terrorism 2003.6 
 
1. Enhancing MDA to mitigate 
maritime threats: 
- Views  of Dana Goward, Director of 
Assessment, Integration, and Risk 
Management U.S. Coast Guard in 
2009.7 
- U.S. DHS' Strategy and Plans 2009 
to Counter Small Vessel Threats.8  
2. Retaliatory strikes: 
- Israeli counter maritime terrorism 
strategy in the 1970s.9  
2. Deterring terrorism:  
- It can be done, by Robert F Trager 
and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva.10   
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2.  Empirical Literature 
The preliminary literature review is enunciated under the following heads: 
 Israel – Israeli coastal defense has been identified as a case study 
to identify the procedures and technologies utilized in territorial sea, 
to enhance their MDA. The review of historical data is also 
envisaged to validate the importance of enhancing MDA.  Some of 
the literature, which has been identified on this subject is:   
 The Threat of Maritime Terrorism to Israel.11   
 Israeli coastal defense.12 
 Policy on Automatic Identification System by ships and boats 
off Israeli coast.13  
 Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) – Preliminary review of the 
literature on MDA primarily indicates that although efforts by 
various countries such as the U.S., Australia and India, are 
underway to detect and identify small boats, but no substantial 
gain(s) has/have been made in identifying small boats. The 
literature in this field comprises:      
 U.S. National plan to achieve Maritime Domain Awareness 
for the national strategy for maritime security.14 
 U.S. Coast Guard Nationwide Automatic Identification 
System.15  
                                            
11  Akiva J. Lorenz, "The Threat of Maritime Terrorism to Israel." 
12  Ibid. 
13  State of Isarel Ministry of Transport and Road Safety, June 18, 2009, 
http://en.mot.gov.il/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=145:rad17m&catid=17:notice
tomariners&Itemid=12 (accessed June 30, 2010). 
14  "U.S. National Plan to achieve Maritime Domain Awareness," October 2005, 
http://www.virginia.edu/colp/pdf/NSMS-National-Plan-to-Achieve-Maritime-Domain-
Awareness.pdf (accessed March 02, 2010). 
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 U.S. Boat Association Reproaches Small Boat Tracking 
Proposals, by Mike Godfrey.16 
 Automatic Identification System (AIS) – The literature reviewed on 
the AIS reveals, that while this system was primarily designed for 
the navigation safety of vessels at sea, but it is being utilized by 
some countries such as Australia, Canada and many European 
countries, for building up their MDA. This system has promise 
towards identification, therefore its fitment on small boats for their 
identification and Low Earth Orbit (LEO) for covering more area, is 
being presently deliberated world over. The literature identified 
under this subject, comprises:          
 International Maritime Organization’s policy regarding fitment 
of AIS.17 
 Efficacy of fitting AIS on small boats.18  
 Spaced-based AIS.19       
 Promising technologies – It is envisaged to review existing 
technologies, which presently are not being utilized in the maritime 
domain, but which could promise the much-needed enhanced MDA 
in the territorial sea for countering the threat of small boat terrorism.  
                                            
15  U.S. Nationwide Automatic Identification System (NAIS), 
http://www.uscg.mil/ACQUISITION/nais/ (accessed March 02, 2010). 
16  Mike Godfrey, U.S. Boat Association Reproaches Small Boat Tracking Proposals, 
December 16, 2009, http://www.tax-news.com/asp/story/story_marine.asp?storyname=40704 
(accessed March 02, 2010). 
17  IMO adopts comprehensive maritime security measures, December 13, 2002, 
http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=583&doc_id=2689 (accessed January 
22, 2010).  
18  Dziewicki, Marek. The Role of AIS for Small Ships. Department of ATON Technique and 
Radionavigation Systems Report, Gdynia: BalticMaster Gdynia, February 2007. 
19  Høye K. Gudrun, Eriksen Torkild, Meland J. Bente and Narheim T. Bjørn, Space based 
AIS for Global Maritime Traffic Monitoring, Norway: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 
2007. 
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The following existing and promising technologies have been 
identified: 
 Tethered Aerostat Sensor Suite:  
 Potential Military Use of Airships and Aerostats – 
CRS report for Congress.20 
 The U.S.’s RAID program:  Small Systems, Big 
Surveillance Time.21  
 Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites for monitoring of AIS.22 
 Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) fitted LEO satellites.23   
F. FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY 
Although the suicide attacks against USS Cole and MV Limburg were 
cases of small boat terrorism, the attacks were not carried out in the territorial 
sea of the countries whose Flag these ships were flying. Israel has been fighting 
maritime terrorism, especially small boat terrorism, in its territorial sea since 
1953, and today it has the best coastal defense in the world.24 Considering these 
facts, the thesis was undertaken in three separate and sequential steps, as: 
 The various existing theories on counterterrorism were reviewed in 
the first step, and the most appropriate of them was identified. 
Utilization of game theory was envisaged to identify the most  
 
 
                                            
20  Christopher Bolkcom, Potential Military Use of Airships and Aerostat, CRS Report for 
Congress, CRS Web, 2005. 
21  "The USA’s RAID Program: Small Systems, Big Surveillance Time," Defense Industry 
Daily, July 19, 2009, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/the-usas-raid-program-small-aerostats-
big-surveillance-time-02779/ (accessed February 07, 2010). 
22  "Satellite-Based AIS: One Giant Leap for Vessel Tracking," Boats, June 06, 2010, 
http://features.boats.com/boat-content/2010/06/satellite-based-ais-one-giant-leap-for-vessel-
tracking/ (accessed August 24, 2010). 
23  "RADARSAT-2," Imaging Notes, Fall 2008, 
http://www.imagingnotes.com/go/article_free.php?mp_id=147 (accessed August 24, 2010). 
24  Akiva J. Lorenz, "The Threat of Maritime Terrorism to Israel." 
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appropriate theory to counter small boat terrorism in the territorial 
sea. This step also identified the independent and dependent 
variables of the identified theory.  
 The second step analyzed a case study appropriate to the identified 
theory, to study the causal relationship between the independent 
and dependent variables. This step would also linked the 
probabilities of occurrence between the various variables and 
identified the existence of a conditional variable(s), if any.  
 Multi-criteria optimization was utilized in the final step to find Pareto 






Game Theory  IVs, DV & CV   Multi Criteria  
 Optimization 
 
Figure 2.   THESIS FLOW CHART 
1. Existing Theories 
The existing counterterrorism theories after literature review have been 
categorized under the following heads: 
 Offensive philosophy comprising pre-emptive and retaliatory strikes. 
 Protective philosophy comprising of deterrence and information 
symmetry by MDA. 
Though there would be more voices attempting to articulate better ways 
and means to effectively counter terrorism, the majority of them could be 











final outcome of modeling by game theory is very much dependent upon the two 
specific players, and also the mathematical interval scaling applied (i.e., 
transforming the payoffs from a scale of 1–4 to 1–10) by utility theory would 
affect the weighted preferences of the outcome; however, a preliminary 
application of game theory indicates that reducing information asymmetry 
between the security forces and terrorists would draw the game in favor of the 
former. Additionally, detection and identification have been identified as the 
independent variables and Maritime Space Transparency (MST) as a dependent 
variable.  
 
       Offensive       Independent  
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2. Case Study 
As mentioned, Israel has been fighting small boat terrorism in its territorial 
sea for more than five decades and today has the best coastal defense in the world. 
Therefore, the Israeli coastal defense was selected as a case study to analyze how 
this country has implemented detection and identification to enhance Maritime 
Space Transparency in its territorial sea. The technologies (i.e., automated shore 
radars, shore-based AIS, Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAVs), Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs), and procedures (i.e., AIS policy) being 
utilized by Israeli coastal defense were analyzed in order to establish a causal 
relationship between the independent variables (i.e., detection and identification) and 
dependent variable (Maritime Space Transparency). Historical data, indicating 
increase or decrease in small boat terrorism in Israeli territorial sea after the country 
adapted MDA to its territorial sea, were utilized for testing the recommended 
hypothesis. Israel's limited coastline of approximately 200 km, a conditional variable 
(environment) of this case, had to be considered, and others routes to overcome this 
constraint had to be analyzed to implement the recommended hypothesis.    
3. Optimization  
Since the asymmetry of information has to address the "when" and 
"where" in addition to the "who" of terror attacks, continuous monitoring in the 
time and space domains for detection and identification were required. Israeli 
coastal defense covers a coastline of approximately 200 km, but for longer 
coastlines, alternative routes had to be explored.  The feasibility of utilizing 
aerostats and LEO satellites, which could enhance MST to adapt MDA for 
territorial sea, were also explored.  The limitation and restriction of the 
technologies recommended for adapting MDA to territorial sea were identified, so 
that these could be utilized to optimize the dependent variable of MST by multi-
criteria optimization techniques. Moreover, since MDA is all about amalgamating 
information from various sources to generate a COP as actionable intelligence, 
the thesis concludes by recommending a solution that could be attached with the 
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II. EXISTING COUNTERTERRORISM THEORIES 
A. STRATEGY   
“All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is 
the strategy out of which victory is evolved.”25  As articulated by Sun Tzu, the 
correct strategy is critical for victory. But one could ask, "What is strategy?"  
Yarger’s strategy model states, “strategy is all about how (way or concept) 
leadership will use the power (means or resources) available to the state to 
exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locations to achieve 
objectives (ends) that support state interests.”26 In order to identify the most 
appropriate philosophy to counter the threat of small boat terror attacks in the 
territorial sea, the existing counterterrorism theories (how of the strategy) based 
on the identified problem (objective of strategy), need to be rationally analyzed.  
Since humans live on land, terror attacks at sea always originate from one 
country or another. As described by Sri Lankan Navy Commander Vice Admiral 
Thisra Samarasinghe while addressing the 19th International Sea Power 
Symposium in Rhode Island, U.S., “A terrorist organization with maritime 
capability needs to operate from foreign soil or a safe base; the prevention of the 
use of foreign soil for all illegal activity particularly on remote islands and isolated 
coastal stretches needs to be addressed.”27 Therefore, other than homegrown 
terrorism, small boat terror attacks in the territorial sea could either be sponsored 
by another country or undertaken by a terrorist organization operating from 
foreign territory. Though it is still debatable, there could be cases of pure 
                                            
25  Sun Tzu, "The Art of War," Classics Archive, http://classics.mit.edu/Tzu/artwar.html 
(accessed April 21, 2010). 
26  Harry R. Yarger, "Toward a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the U.S. Army War College 
Strategy Model," USAWC Guide to National Security Issues, Vol I: Theory of War and Strategy, 
43–49, Carlisle, United States: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College (SSI), 
2008. 
27  Vice Admiral Thisra Samarasinghe, "Sri Lankan Navy's role in eradicating international 
maritime terrorism." Sri Lanka Guardian. October 25, 2009. 
http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2009/10/sri-lankan-navys-role-in-eradicating.html (accessed May 
07, 2010). 
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homegrown terrorism without external assistance; nevertheless, in the case of 
such homegrown terrorism both offensive and protective counterterrorism can be 
undertaken, while in the case of the involvement of another state, offensive 
counterterrorism actions would amount to international armed conflict. In such 
cases, the success of countering these types of attacks by their sheer nature 
would greatly depend upon the role played by the nation state from which the 
terrorist organizations operate.    
Conflict has been a central theme throughout human history and 
literatures. It arises whenever two or more individuals, with different 
values, compete to try to control the course of events. Game theory 
uses mathematical tools to study situation involving both conflict 
and cooperation. Its study was greatly stimulated by the publication 
in 1944 of the monumental “Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern.” The 
players in a game, who may be people, organizations, or even 
countries, choose from a list of options available to them – that is, 
courses of action they might take – that are called strategies. The 
strategies chosen by the players lead to outcome, which describe 
the consequences of their choices. We assume that the players 
have preferences for the outcome: they like some more than 
others. Game theory analyzes the rational choices of strategies – 
that is, how players select strategies to obtain preferred 
outcomes.28                        
The application of Game theory would thus provide appropriate mathematical 
tools to identify the most appropriate philosophy to counter the small boat terror 
attacks. To rationally analyze counterterrorism theories with Game theory, 
existing theories of counterterrorism have been categorized as either offensive or 
protective.      
B.  OFFENSIVE PHILOSOPHY 
“We will not rest until terrorist groups of global reach have been found, 
have been stopped, and have been defeated – U.S. President George W. Bush, 
                                            
28  Consortium for Mathematics, For All Practical Purposes: Introduction to Contemporary 
Mathematics, New York: W H Freeman & Company, 1996. 
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06 November 2001.”29 Post-9/11, the then president of United States articulated 
a very offensive counterterrorism strategy as stated in the 2003 — U.S. national 
strategy for combating terrorism. This to date has been the most offensive 
counterterrorism strategy followed by any nation in the world. Historically, Israel 
has utilized the retaliatory strike strategy against other states and terrorist 
organizations operating from foreign territory to counter maritime terrorism, as 
pointed out by Lorenz “the maritime terrorism attacks in the 1970s and early 
1980s had direct implications on Israel’s defense doctrines, which called for even 
harder military retaliation against terrorist infrastructures, thereby often invading 
the sovereign territory of third state.”30 Although, the offensive strategy against 
terrorists can be further sub-divided into pre-emptive or retaliatory strikes, 
depending upon the time at which the offensive is launched; but in both the 
cases action to counterterrorism actions against organizations operating from 
foreign territory, without the concurrence or cooperation of the host country would 
amount to an international armed conflict as per the Geneva Conventions’ Rules 
of Law for Armed Conflict, which states that “an armed conflict confined 
geographically to the territory of a single state can, however, be qualified as 
international if a foreign state intervenes with its armed forces on the side of the 
rebels fighting against government forces.”31  An offensive strike against terrorist 
base camps, especially the planners and executors of small boat terror attacks, 
could also be deep inside foreign territory and would be very difficult to justify to 
the international community in today’s age where information travels faster than a 
bullet.   
Following the Coastal Road attack, Israel launched a wide scope of 
military actions, in order to prevent Palestinian terrorism from 
Lebanon. On 14 March 1978, Israel launched Operation Litani. 
During the seven-day offensive, the IDF first captured a belt of land 
approximately 10 kilometers deep with the aim of pushing 
                                            
29  U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. 
30  Akiva J. Lorenz, "The Threat of Maritime Terrorism to Israel." 
31  Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, http://www.adh-
geneva.ch/RULAC/qualification_of_armed_conflict.php (accessed May 07, 2010). 
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Palestinian militant groups, particularly the PLO, away from the 
border with Israel. The operation was later expanded in order to 
occupy all the territory, with the exception of Tyre, up to the Litani 
River. However, despite the superiority of the IDF and the high 
casualties on both sides, the operation did not destroy the 
Palestinian terror infrastructure in Lebanon. Israel’s invasions into 
Lebanon also resulted in UN Resolution 425 and Resolution 426 
calling for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon and the 
establishment of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) with the 
mandate to restore peace and sovereignty to Lebanon.32 
Terrorists, akin to insurgents, always exploit the information advantage (i.e., the 
terrorists identity and location are not precisely known) to counter the force 
advantage of the counterterror forces. Therefore, even with the cooperation of 
the host country, counterterror forces first have to locate the terrorists in order to 
counter them, and this would definitely cause some collateral damage, even if 
so-called smart intelligent weapons are used. Countering the executors of small 
boat terror attacks in the planning or training phase is undoubtedly a better 
counterterrorism strategy considering the earliest and furthest elimination of the 
enemy; but it could  be very expensive in terms of finances and resources 
(including human), if these operations are stretched in time.  According to the 
U.S. Congressional Research Service Report of 2009, U.S. since 9/11 has spent 
$944 billion on the war on terror.    
Based on DOD estimates and budget submissions, the cumulative 
total for funds appropriated from the 9/11 attacks through FY2009, 
total funding enacted to date for DOD, State/USAID and VA for 
medical costs for the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and enhanced 
security is $944 billion.33 
C. PROTECTIVE PHILOSOPHY 
As articulated by Goward, Director of Assessment, Integration and Risk 
Management of U.S. Coast Guard in his article “Maritime Domain Awareness -- 
The Whole is Greater than the Sum of Its:” 
                                            
32  Akiva J. Lorenz, "The Threat of Maritime Terrorism to Israel." 
33  Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations 
Since 9/11, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 2009. 
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The recent piracy cases off the coast of Somalia have illustrated, 
there is a significant need for Maritime Domain Awareness - the 
ability to detect, classify and identify vessels at sea. We need 
greater awareness on the high seas as well as along our coastlines 
for safety and security purposes. This need has been universally 
agreed upon by the international maritime community.34  
Further, in his view, “maritime threats, including piracy and the potential use of 
small vessels, can be mitigated through greater MDA.”35 The concept of MDA 
requires collection of information from various sources including but not limited to 
the state-of-the-art electronic sensors from different platforms, such as satellites, 
ships, aircrafts, unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned surface vehicles and 
shore-based stations. The information so collated is then amalgamated and 
transformed, by detecting and identifying vessels at sea, into actionable 
intelligence in the form of Common Operating Picture (COP). Based on the 
classification of the contacts in the COP, which comprises friendly, hostile or 
unclassified contacts, the targets can be further investigated or engaged. “The 
Navy has achieved MDA for years at the tactical level to dominate areas 
surrounding Carrier and Expeditionary Strike Groups, but in the context of the 
global war on terrorism (GWOT), MDA takes on a strategic dimension.”36 Though 
MDA has been institutionalized recently, this concept has been in existence ever 
since man ventured onto the seas. In earlier days, mariners utilized optical 
devices like telescopes and binoculars for building up domain awareness, by 
sighting and visually identifying objects around their ships. The information so 
obtained was exchanged amongst the ships of the fleet using various types of 
flags.  As technology advanced, the means accommodated its incorporation, but 
the concept has remained the same, which necessitates the collation of 
information for its transformation into actionable intelligence, by detecting and 
identifying the contacts in the desired domain. Therefore, the same system of 
                                            
34  Dana Goward, "Maritime Domain Awareness -- The Whole is Greater than the Sum of 
Its." 
35  Ibid. 
36  "Maritime Domain Awareness," GlobalSecurity, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/mda.htm (accessed May 07, 2010). 
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MDA, which has been in existence for years, if adapted to the territorial sea, 
could counter the threat of small boat terror attacks. There is no doubt that 
terrorists today are unpredictable, networked and constantly evolving new tactics, 
compared to the conventional enemy of the yesteryears. An efficient network of 
sensors to provide MDA in the territorial sea, would therefore ensure protection 
against the threat of small boat terrorism. As pointed out by Akiva J. Lorenz, in 
“The Threat of Maritime Terrorism to Israel,”   
The maritime terrorism attacks in the 1970s and early 1980s had 
direct implications on Israel’s defense doctrines, which called for 
even harder military retaliation against terrorist infrastructures, 
thereby often invading the sovereign territory of third states. 
Moreover, these attacks showed the necessity to increase the 
navy's budget, in order to improve Israel’s existing coastal defense 
layout and establish new regulations relating to maritime safety.37  
Unlike the situation in the 1980s, where the terror threat could be limited to a 
terrorist organization; today the terror threat could be simultaneously from many 
terrorist organizations with similar ideology, could involve transnational terrorist 
organizations like Al-Qaeda, or could even involve the exploitation of some other 
states' territory. The present situation is only likely to further complicate as more 
terrorist organizations exploit the information age to connect on ideology, utilize 
the Internet for training and secure communication, emulate tactics from past 
successful terror attacks, and exploit the territory of some failed, weak, rouge or 
even neutral states. Such an environment has to be considered the background 
while analyzing the protective philosophy of MDA involving enhanced maritime 
surveillance for coastal defense and the offensive philosophy of pre-emptive and 
/ or retaliatory strikes against the terrorists’ base camps with the game theory.    
D.  GAME THEORY 
In order to analyze the offensive and protective philosophies used to 
counter the threat of small boat terrorism in territorial sea, it is important to 
identify the players and various options available to them.  As stated earlier, in 
                                            
37  Akiva J. Lorenz, "The Threat of Maritime Terrorism to Israel." 
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case of homegrown terrorism, both offensive action on land and protective action 
at sea can be initiated against the terrorist organizations. But, in case of 
involvement of another country in terms of state-sponsored terrorism or if terrorist 
organization are operating from foreign territory, a dilemma whether to take 
offensive action arises. The two players in this game then happen to be the terror 
victim state and terror origin state. The options available to the terror origin state 
are to take action against the terrorists or not to take action against them. The 
terror victim state could follow either the offensive philosophy, which as pointed 
out earlier would be construed as an international armed conflict according to the 
Geneva Conventions’ Rules of Law for Armed Conflict; or protective philosophy 
by adapting MDA for the territorial sea.  There could also be more voices 
attempting to articulate better philosophy with which to handle such terror 
attacks; but the majority of them could be classified as one of these categories, 
or as a combination of them. Additionally, as all possible situations need to be 
analyzed to have a logical outcome by Game Theory, the above two likely 
responses by terror victim state would be utilized, as these are all encompassing. 
1. Game Setup 
To progress the game theory, it has been assumed that both players are 
rational and are attempting to maximize their strategy, and that the terror victim 
state has the military capability to launch an offensive against the terror origin 
state. 
 Options for terror origin state: 
 (C) - Takes no action against the terrorists (i.e., those 
involved from their country in small boat terror attacks). 
 (D) - Takes action against the terrorists (i.e., those involved 
from their country in small boat terror attacks). 
 Options for terror victim state: 
 (A) – Offensive. 
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 (B) – Protective.  
 
Terror Origin State  


















State  Protective (B) BC  BD  
Figure 4.   GAME SETUP  
The four possible outcomes of the game would be: 
 AC – Terror origin state takes no action against the terrorists; terror 
victim state goes offensive. 
 AD – Terror origin state takes action against the terrorists: terror 
victim state goes offensive. 
 BC – Terror origin state takes no action against the terrorists; terror 
victim state remains protective. 
 BD – Terror origin state takes action against the terrorists; terror 
victim state remains protective. 
It would be safe to assume that different perspectives could also be justified 
and could yield different rankings, but for this game the following rank order has 
been established based on the fact that the cost of armed conflict including human 
resources would be much higher than establishing an effective MDA in territorial sea, 
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as according to the U.S. Congressional Research Service Report of 2009, the U.S. 
since 9/11 have spent $944 billion on the war on terror:38 
 Terror victim state: 
 4 – Best – Terror origin state takes action against the 
terrorists; terror victim state remains protective.  
 3 – Next Best – Terror origin state takes no action against 
the terrorists; terror victim state remains protective. 
 2 – Least Best – Terror origin state takes no action against 
the terrorists; terror victim state goes offensive. 
 1 – Worst – Terror origin state takes action against the 
terrorists: terror victim state goes offensive. 
Considering the higher cost of offensive action, the payoff for protective 
has been rated higher than that of offensive.   
  Terror origin state: 
 4 – Best – Terror origin state takes no action against the 
terrorists; terror victim state remains protective. 
 3 – Next Best – Terror origin state takes action against the 
terrorists; terror victim state remains protective. 
 2 – Least Best – Terror origin state takes no action against 
the terrorists; terror victim state goes offensive. 
 1 – Worst – Terror origin state takes action against the 
terrorists: terror victim state goes offensive. 
Based on the ranking of the various options, the outcome of the game 
without the players communicating would be as:    
 
                                            
38  Amy Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations 
Since 9/11, CRS Report for Congress. 
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Terror Origin State   


































Figure 5.   PARTIAL CONFLICT GAME  
In Figure 5, the arrows indicate both players maximizing their payoffs. As 
indicated above, each player has a pure dominant strategy. The terror origin 
state’s pure dominant strategy is not to take any action against the terrorists and 
the terror victim state’s pure dominant strategy is to remain protective. The Nash 
Equilibrium is a point from which neither player can benefit by unilaterally 
changing its strategy.  The Nash Equilibrium of this game is (BC), (3, 4), i.e., the 
terror origin state takes no action against the terrorists and the terror victim state 
continues to remains protective.  
2. Strategic Moves      
The strategic moves of this game with both players communicating with 
each other would be: 
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a. First Move  
 Should terror victim state move first: 
 If terror victim state does A, then terror origin state 
does C, outcome (2, 2). 
 If terror victim state does B, then terror origin state 
does C, outcome (3, 4). 
Terror victim state would choose outcome (3, 4), as this is better 
from its perspective. 
 Should terror origin state move first: 
 If terror origin state does C, then terror victim state 
does B, outcome (3, 4). 
 If terror origin state does D, then terror victim state 
does B, outcome (4, 3). 
Terror origin state would choose outcome (3, 4), as this is better 
from its perspective. 
Neither terror victim state nor terror origin state has a first move, 
and also neither would benefit any better than the present Nash Equilibrium of (3, 
4). 
b. Can Terror Victim State Threaten Terror Origin State? 
 Terror victim state wants, terror origin state to play D (take 
action against terrorists). 
 If terror origin state does C, then terror victim state threatens 
to do A, outcome (2, 2). 
 Normally, if terror origin state does C, then terror victim state 
does B, outcome (3, 4) 
 Threat exists, as the threatened outcome hurts both the 
players. 
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 If terror origin state does D, then terror victim state does B, 
outcome (4, 3). 
 The threat exists and works alone best, as outcome (4, 3) is 
better for terror victim state. 
Terror victim state can threaten terror origin state to take play D 
(take action against terrorists).  
c. Can Terror Victim State Promise Terror Origin State? 
 Terror victim state wants, terror origin state to play D (take 
action against terrorists). 
 If terror origin state does D, then terror victim state promises 
to do A, outcome (1, 1). 
Normally, if terror origin state does D, then terror victim state does 
B, outcome (4, 3). 
Terror victim state can’t promise terror origin state, as the promised 
outcome would be worst for both the players.   
d. Can Terror Origin State Threaten or Promise Terror 
Victim State? 
As the present outcome is the best for terror origin state, the terror 
origin state would not like to threaten or promise.      
Analysis of all the strategic moves, indicate that terror victim state 
can threaten terror origin state to play D (take action against terrorists). 
3. Interval Scaling 
Until now, we have only considered a scale of order of numbers (i.e., 1 is 
better than 2, 2 is better than 3 and 3 is better than 4), for the players in this 
game. However, in order to have a more meaningful analysis and outcomes, an 
interval scale that also caters for the ratio of differences of numbers is more 
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appropriate. As stated by Straffin, “a scale on which not only the order of 
numbers, but also the ratios of differences of the numbers is meaningful is called 
an interval scale.”39 While working out the absolute payoffs, it has been assumed 
that a small boat terror attack has not been detected and identified by the terror 
victim state’s MDA, and this state would be in a better position compared to the 
terror origin state if she launches an offensive against the latter. The payoffs are 
based on the assumptions, and different status of terror victim state’s MDA and 
the actual military capability of both the players could change their absolute 
value, but the relative hierarchy of the payoffs would be the same. The absolute 
payoffs have been accorded to later analyze, how the game can be tilted in the 
favor of the terror victim state.        
 Terror victim state: 
 10 – Best – Terror origin state takes action against the 
terrorists; terror victim state remains protective (as this is the 
best option for terror victim state).   
 5 – Next Best – Terror origin state takes no action against 
the terrorists; terror victim state remains protective (since the 
terrorists could infiltrate the terror victim state’s MDA,  low 
absolute value of the protective stance has been accorded).   
 4 – Least Best – Terror origin state takes no action against 
the terrorists; terror victim state goes offensive (considering 
that terror victim state would be in an advantageous position 
compared to the terror origin state).   
 1 – Worst – Terror origin state takes action against the 
terrorists: terror victim state goes offensive (as this is the 
worst option). 
                                            
39  Philip D. Straffin, Game Theory and Strategy, The Mathematical Association of America, 
1975. 
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 Terror origin state: 
 10 – Best – Terror origin state takes no action against the 
terrorists; terror victim state remains protective (as this is the 
best option for terror origin state).  
 9 – Next Best – Terror origin state takes action against the 
terrorists; terror victim state remains protective (considering 
that terror origin state would have to put in some effort to 
take action against its citizens).    
 2 – Least Best – Terror origin state takes no action against 
the terrorists; terror victim state goes offensive (considering 
that terror origin state would be in a disadvantageous 
position compared to terror victim state).   
 1 – Worst – Terror origin state takes action against the 
terrorists: terror victim state goes offensive (as this is the 
worst option). 
Terror Origin State    




























Figure 6.   INTERVAL SCALED GAME 
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This picture, along with the analyzed strategic moves, conveys that: 
 Terror origin state’s pure dominant strategy is not to take action 
against the terrorists, and have an absolute payoff of 10 in this 
game. 
 Terror victim state’s pure dominant strategy is to remain protective, 
and have an absolute payoff of 5 in this game.    
 Terror victim state could coerce terror origin state to take action 
against the terrorists, as this game has a threat and moreover since 
there is only slight reduction in terror origin state’s payoff (i.e., from 
an absolute value of 10 to 9).  
 Terror victim state should increase its BC Strategy’s (protective 
strategy even if terror origin state takes no action against the 
terrorists) payoff, which is presently 5, by improving its MDA in 
territorial sea. 
4. Security Level    
Until now, the game has been analyzed from a pure economics 
standpoint, where both the players are maximizing their respective payoffs. To 
analyze this game from the security standpoint, the security levels of each player 
would also have to be analyzed. The security levels are the minimum assured 
payoffs for each player when the other player starts minimizing the opponent.  
 Terror victim state: 
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Figure 7.   TERROR VICTIM STATE SECURITY LEVEL GAME 
In this game, terror victim state has a security level (minimum assured 
payoff) of 5, and the prudential strategy is to remain protective.     
 Terror origin state: 
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Figure 8.   TERROR ORIGIN STATE SECURITY LEVEL GAME 
In this game, terror origin state has a security level (minimum assured 
payoff) of 2, and the prudential strategy is not to take action against terrorists.  
5. Nash Arbitration  
Is the security level solution of (5, 2) (i.e., terror victim state’s SL of 5 and 
terror origin state’s SL of 2) Pareto optimal? An outcome is Pareto optimal, if no 
superior outcome exists. To further analyze the best solution from the point of 
both security and stability, the game is graphically represented as:      
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Figure 9.    NASH ARBITRATION GRAPH 
As can be seen in Figure 9, the present security level of (5, 2) is not a 
Pareto optimal solution. The Nash Point, a Pareto optimal solution of this game is 
(10, 9). This solution is the BD outcome of this game, implying that terror origin 
state should take action against the terrorists and terror victim state should 
continue her protective strategy. However, if the terror victim state adapts her 
MDA to the territorial sea by enhancing coastal surveillance against small boats; 
then its assumed absolute payoff of 5, would increase depending upon the 
effectiveness of its MDA in the territorial sea up to a maximum value of 9. This 
implies that the present security level of (5,2) could be changed to (9,2) by the 
terror victim state by enhancing its coastal surveillance against small boats. 
Although this is still not a Pareto optimum solution, it would place the terror victim 
state in a much more advantageous position to coerce the terror origin state to 
take action against the terrorist organizations operating from its territory or to 
deter the terror origin state from supporting terrorism. Even if the terror origin 
state does act against the terrorist organizations, a security level payoff of 9 for 
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the terror victim state achieved by enhancing coastal surveillance against small 
boats, provides an excellent strategy against the small boat terror attacks in 
territorial sea.             
6. Conclusion 
The Game theory utilized to analyze the situation of countering small boat 
terrorism reveals; the terror victim state can coerce the terror origin state to take 
action against the terrorist organizations operating from its territory or deter the 
terror origin state from supporting terrorism, provided the former threatens the 
latter with an offensive action that hurts them both and has dire consequences 
for the terror origin state. The terror victim state should take action as demanded 
by the terror victim state to improve the security and overall stability between 
them. However, if the terror origin state does not take action, and the terror victim 
state goes offensive against the former then in addition to the dire consequences 
faced by the terror origin state, the payoff for the terror victim state would be very 
high for long engagement both financially and in terms of resources including 
human power. The preferred option for the terror victim state should be to 
improve its MDA in its territorial sea for enhanced coastal surveillance in order to 
counter the threat of small boat terror attacks. This would not only put it in an 
advantageous position to coerce the terror origin state to take action against the 
terrorist organizations operating from its territory, but with the highest possible 
security level that can be achieved without the cooperation of the terror origin 
state, it will also provide the best strategy for the terror victim state to counter the 
threat of small boat terror attacks in territorial sea by enhancing its coastal 













III. MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS   
A.  INFORMATION ASYMMETRY 
As articulated by McCormick, “insurgents always exploit the information 
advantage, their identity (who), place of attack (where) and time of attack (when) 
unknown to state; to overcome the force advantage, military power of the 
state.”40  Terrorists also utilize the same strategy to negate the force advantage 
of counterterrorism forces. Actionable intelligence, if available to counterterrorism 
forces, can overcome this information advantage being exploited by the 
terrorists, and therefore becomes the most vital requirement for a successful 
counterterrorism operation. “Maritime Domain Awareness is all about generating 
actionable intelligence, the cornerstone of successful counterterrorist and 
maritime law enforcement operations.”41 In order to provide actionable 
intelligence, MDA has to collect information from various sources and convert it 
into a Common Operating Picture (COP).  However, in order to generate 
actionable intelligence in the form of COP, the clarity of the desired maritime area 
has to be enhanced by tagging and tracking all contacts utilizing a network of 
appropriate sensors. In conventional wars, navies have been able to make the 
battle space clearer through network centric operations, but the maritime 
environment in a nation's own coastal waters is cluttered with small boats almost 
all of which are friendly. To enhance the transparency of the desired maritime 
space in densely cluttered own coastal waters, a different approach from that 
required on the high sea is required. Enhancing the transparency of the maritime 
space on the high seas requires the identification of the hostile units from the 
neutral contacts, as the location of own units is well known; but the identification 
of hostile units in territorial sea would also necessitate their identification from 
friendly contacts, like own fishing and / or other small boats. Identification of the 
                                            
40  Gordon H. McCormick, Defence Analysis Class, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
July 16, 2009. 
41  Maritime Domain Awareness, GlobalSecurity. 
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hostile units from the friendly contacts, in addition to undertaking the same with 
the neutrals contacts, therefore, becomes the most fundamental requirement for 
enhancing the clarity of maritime space in the territorial sea. Although the 
fundamental of MDA at high sea and in the territorial sea (i.e., collating 
information for generating a COP to provide actionable intelligence) may remain 
the same, but the latter requires an additional capability for identifying the hostile 
units from friendly contacts.  This capability would be like a patch, which when 
attached with the existing MDA would adapt it to the territorial sea. The aim of 
this thesis is primarily to provide this patch, which would function like a security 
update to computer software, fixing the existing MDA capability in order to 
counter the threat of small boat terrorism in the territorial sea.    
B. MARITIME SPACE TRANSPARENCY  
One of the main problems in counterterrorism today is that there 
are so many people and vehicles, and so much data and material, 
moving through globalization's myriad networks that it seems 
virtually impossible to track it all effectively. Nowhere has this 
problem been more acute than on the high seas. In 2006, Adm. 
Harry Ulrich, then U.S. commander of NATO Naval Forces Europe, 
decided to do something about it. Despite having virtually no 
resources, his dream was to transpose the global air-traffic control 
system onto sea traffic. Worldwide, aircraft are transparent, 
because they're all required to carry an identification beacon that 
allows them to be tracked leaving and entering airports, and 
monitored between airports, by a global network of sensors. Act 
suspiciously and somebody's fighter aircraft will soon be on your 
tail. No such pervasive system currently exists globally for maritime 
traffic. While bigger ships carry an ID beacon similar to aircraft, 
without a shared monitoring network, that's like tracking only 
selected commercial jets and giving everyone else a pass. So 
Ulrich, upon taking command, asked a simple question: "If we can 
do that in the air, why can't we do it on the sea?"42  
Maritime Space Transparency (MST), as used in this thesis, is the degree 
of transparency of the desired maritime space. Complete Maritime Space 
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Transparency in terms of percentage would indicate that the identity of all the 
contacts, with respect to their being friendly or hostile, has been established in 
this space. Thus, hundred percent MST would imply that the identity of all 
contacts has been established, and zero percent would indicate that none of 
them has been detected and identified. To establish the nature of all the contacts 
in a desired maritime space, a network of sensors should therefore be capable of 
detecting and identifying them.  Thus, detection and identification turn out to be 
the two variables that govern the MST. Traditionally, contacts at sea are first 
detected by some equipment like radar, and thereafter, those contacts are 
identified by visual or other means; in such scenarios, the probabilities of 
detection and identification would be governed by the conditional law, as the 
probability of identification given the occurrence of detection. Whereas, if the AIS 
(which automatically broadcasts the identity of the contact without being triggered 
by detection) is being utilized, the probabilities of detection and identification 
become independent, as the probability of the radar detecting the contacts does 
not affect the occurrence of probability of identification by AIS. A Venn diagram of 
the maritime space with regard to the probabilities of detection and identification 






















Figure 10.   VENN DIAGRAM OF VARIABLES  
The Venn diagram indicates that in a desired maritime space, the Maritime 
Space Transparency is the intersection of the probability of detection and the 
probability of identification of the contacts. Mathematically, this can be expressed 
as: 
Maritime Space Transparency = P (Detection) ∩ P (Identification) 
Maritime Space Transparency = P (Detection) x P (Identification) 
Therefore, in order to increase the maritime space transparency, the 
following needs to be undertaken 
 Probability of detection and the probability of identification 
independently needs to be increased 
 Detection and identification information originating from different 
sensors needs to be fused to provide a greater intersection of their 
probabilities. 
 Detected contacts not identified need to be investigated and 
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 Contacts automatically broadcasting their positions for identification 
but not yet detected, need to be investigated for confirming their 
presence.   
In the preceding paragraphs, the relationship between the MST and the 
probabilities of detection and identification has been exhibited mathematically. In 
the succeeding section, the process of how Israel enhanced the MST in its 
territorial waters would be traced through in history to establish its efficacy for 
effectively countering the threat of small boat terrorism. The case study of Israel 
would also be utilized to identify the appropriate means of detection and 
identification utilized by Israel to increase their probabilities for enhancing the 
MST.        
C. ISRAEL A CASE STUDY  
Historically, Israel has immense experience in countering small boat 
terrorism, as this country has been combating it since 1970. It was in the 1970s, 
that Palestinian terror organizations started using the sea to infiltrate Israel. 
Three out of the four major terrorist attacks in Israel in the 1970s, i.e., Tel Aviv’s 
Savoy hotel attack in March 1975, Coastal Road attack in March 1978 and Haran 
attack in April 1979, were small boat terror attacks. On 24 June 1974, the first 
terror attack to use the sea as a means of infiltrating Israel was undertaken by 
three terrorists who landed on the Naharia beach, having set sail from Lebanon.  
These terrorists seized several hostages in a nearby apartment building, killed 
four people and wounded eight, before being killed by the Israeli security forces. 
“Three Arab Muslim terrorists entered Israel and seized hostages in an 
apartment building in Nahariyya. They killed four Jews and wounded eight more 
before they themselves were killed in a gun battle.”43 In response to this attack, 
Israel attempted to enhance its MST on its northern border by setting up coastal 
radar station and lookouts. “The Israeli security forces, especially the navy, 
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increased their security measures on the northern border to prevent further 
infiltration, by setting up not only a radar station and lookouts at Rosh Hanikra, but 
also by introducing security zones in which no civilian shipping and swimming was 
allowed.”44 Although the coastal radar would have provided a good probability of 
detection, but relying only on visual lookouts could hardly have provided any 
probability of identification. Therefore, in addition to lookouts Israel also established 
a security zone, in which no civilian shipping or swimming was allowed, to facilitate 
classification of contacts, in order to increase the probability of identification. The 
concept of establishing such zones for identification has been used throughout 
military history, the most prominent being the Maritime Exclusive Zone and Total 
Exclusive Zone established by United Kingdom in the Falkland War; but the efficacy 
of such zones in increasing  the probability of identification largely depends upon the 
capability of the authority promulgating it, to prevent neutral from entering this zone. 
Additionally, such zones can only be promulgated for a limited duration due to their 
effect on maritime traffic and eventual disruptive effect on the country’s economy. 
After the implementation of such measures in Israel’s northern territorial 
waters, terrorist changed their tactics to circumvent these measures. On 5 
March, 1975, terrorists utilized boats launched from a mother ship from the west, 
to land on Tel Aviv beach and attack the Savoy hotel. The Israeli Security Forces 
killed the terrorists, but in the process, seven hostages also lost their lives.   
On 5 March 1975, Arab terrorists landed on the Tel Aviv beach and 
attacked the Savoy hotel, capturing parts of the building and 
holding hostages. The terrorists were assaulted by the Israeli 
Defense Forces, most of them were killed and a number captured. 
But 7 hostages lost their lives. A day later, the vessel that brought 
the terrorists to the point where they transferred to rubber boats 
was seized by the Israeli navy.45 
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In response to the Savoy hotel attack, Israel increased the number of ships and 
aircrafts for maritime patrols and searches, respectively, in order to enhance its 
reconnaissance capability in the Mediterranean Sea. While these measures may 
have prevented some terrorist attempts and also resulted in countering a terrorist 
speedboat at the Tel Aviv Marina in September 1976, they could not prevent the 
Coastal Road attack on 11 March 1978, which killed a total of 37 people and 
injured more than 70. These measures to increase the detection and 
identification capabilities were primarily accomplished by moving platforms such 
as ships and aircraft, and therefore could not provide continuous enhanced MST 
in the time and spatial domains.   
After the 11 March 1978, Bus Hijacking on the Coastal Road, Israel 
launched a major military incursion into South Lebanon, called the 
Litani River Operation. Israel crossed into southern Lebanon on 
March 15 and struck at PLO terrorist bases and staging areas 
south of the Litani River, up to ten kilometers deep inside the 
country. Twenty-one IDF soldiers were killed before the operation 
ended on 21 March 1978.46   
In spite of force superiority, Israel’s offensive action against Lebanon could not 
destroy the Palestinian terror infrastructure in Lebanon. This invasion of Lebanon 
only resulted in the United Nations Organization passing resolution 425 and 426, 
directing Israel to withdraw its forces from Lebanon and inducted United Nations 
Interim Force in Lebanon.   
Having heard the statements of permanent representatives of 
Lebanon and Israel, gravely concerned at the deterioration of the 
situation in the Middle East and its consequences to the 
maintenance of international peace, convinced that the present 
situation impedes the achievement of a just peace in the Middle 
East; United Nations Organization calls: for strict respect for the 
territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of 
Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries, upon  
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Israel immediately to cease its military action against Lebanese 
territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all 
Lebanese territory.47   
Israel with its 1970s and 1980s experience of maritime terrorism focused 
its maritime counterterrorism strategy more towards protective measures.  As 
early as the 1990s, this strategy proved effective and increased the difficulty of 
the maritime terrorists operating against Israel.  
On May 30, 1990 Israeli security forces foiled an attempt by PLF 
terrorists to infiltrate Israel from the sea near Gaash and Nitzanim. 
Code named Al-Quds, the 16 terrorists departed from Benghazi, 
Libya on May 27, 1990 on a Libyan ship. Following the failed plot, 
the PLO announced through Kaled al-Hassan on June 4, 1990, that 
the PLF operation was utilizing the wrong technique “because 
everyone knows that Israel has stated that its radar lab can scan as 
far as Malta.48  
Israel's protective strategy has been primarily two-pronged. The first level 
comprises of enhancing the MDA by gathering intelligence from various sources 
including long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft. The second level closer to 
coast concentrates on increasing the MST in the time and spatial domains by 
deploying a network of coastal sensors. 
The first protection stage consists of intelligence gathered by the 
various Israeli intelligence services and the Foreign Ministry. Israel 
also relies on land-based aerial reconnaissance patrols (Shahaf 
Maritime Aircraft) and patrols conducted by Israeli naval ships 
(Sa’ar 4-5), in order to secure a maritime situational awareness of 
its western border. While the outer border of these controls is set at 
100 nautical miles off the Israeli Coast, the lateral borders are 
specified by the territorial waters and air traffic regulations of each 
neighboring country. On closer range (up to 32 nautical miles) nine 
Israeli radar stations situated along the coast from Rosh Hanikra in 
the north to Erez near the Gaza Strip, provide the Central 
Command Center (C4I), through its three local command centers 
Haifa, Ashdod and the Red Sea Region, with a complete picture of 
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all maritime movements. Furthermore, these regional command 
centers can direct up to eleven coastal patrol boats (Mediterranean 
coastline), in order to intercept suspicious ships / floating objects. 
Following the withdrawal of the Israeli Defense Forces from the 
Gaza Strip in August 2005, Israel’s navy found itself replacing its 
physical barriers and reconnaissance posts, such as Tel Ridan in 
Gaza, with technical sensors near the border with the Gaza Strip. 
These technical sensors consist of infiltration detection sensors 
such as the Long Range Reconnaissance and Observation System 
(LORROS) built by Elbit which teamed up with IAI's subsidiary Elta 
System’s EL/M-2226 coastal surveillance radar system. EL/M-2226 
is designed to detect patrol boats at ranges up to 32 nautical miles. 
Mounted atop 820ft.-high smokestacks at the nearby Ashkelon 
power station, the dual system provides the operator with a deep 
view into the Gaza Strip. Moreover, as part of Israel’s effort to 
reduce spending, the Israeli Navy will replace part of its manned 
coastal surveillance stations with unmanned radar stations by 2008. 
Unmanned radar stations, stationed on high vantage points far from 
population centers along the coast, can be more powerful and 
therefore provide greater coverage and resolution.49 
The Israeli coastal defense system utilizes a chain of nine coastal radars 
networked together to provide a continuous coverage of up to 32 nautical miles 
from the coast for 24 hours each day every week round the year (24/7/356).  
These radars have special features like Inverse Synthetic Aperture (ISA) function 
to generate two-dimensional high-resolution images of the targets. This feature 
provides target discrimination capability by measuring the dimensions (extent 
and height) of the target. Though the extent of the target would depend upon its 
aspect, the Inverse Synthetic Aperture tool could be utilized effectively to 
differentiate between small, medium and large targets. The radars are primarily 
utilized for detection, but the Inverse Synthetic Aperture feature does provide 
limited identification capability.  
Post-9/11 terror attacks, the International Maritime Organization to counter 
the threat of maritime terrorism adopted International Ship and Port Facility 
Security (ISPS) Code in 2002. This regulation mandated the fitment of the AIS on 
all ships of 300 tons and more by 31 December 2004.  
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In 2000, IMO adopted a new requirement (as part of a revised new 
chapter V) for all ships to carry automatic identification systems 
(AISs) capable of providing information about the ship to other 
ships and to coastal authorities automatically. The regulation 
requires AIS to be fitted aboard all ships of 300 gross tonnage and 
upwards engaged on international voyages, cargo ships of 500 
gross tonnage and upwards not engaged on international voyages 
and all passenger ships irrespective of size. The requirement 
became effective for all ships by 31 December 2004. 50 
This system is designed to automatically provide the ship’s identity, 
position, course and speed to other ships, aircrafts and shore stations, however 
the warships, government vessels, fishing vessels and vessels smaller than 300 
tons are exempted from the fitment of the AIS. As per the existing regulations, 
this system without any further enforcement by the coastal state cannot be 
utilized for identifying small boats. To improve the probability of identification of 
its coastal defense system, Israel mandates that all ships and small crafts, when 
within 100 nm and 25 nm respectively from Israeli coast, should have their AIS 
activated.51 Any ship or craft that does not meet this requirement, is further 
classified by long-range day and night shore based, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(UAV) and Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) fitted optical sensors. The Israeli 
coastal defense system thus maintains an enhanced MST 32 nautical mile from 
its coastline, by utilizing radars, AIS, and day and night electro optical sensors. 
Their networking on a common grid ensures optimum data fusing for a greater 
intersection of the probabilities of detection and identification, to enhance MST. 
Additionally, contacts that have been detected and not identified are further 
investigated with shore-based, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and Unmanned 
Surface Vehicle (USV) fitted with day and night electro-optical sensors, to ensure 
the near-complete intersection of the detection and identification probabilities. 
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Unlike the Israeli Heron UAV, which can carry a multiple sensor payload, such as 
radar and / or electro optical sensors; the Israeli Navy's Protector USV is only fitted 
with electro-optical sensor and a laser range finder. The platforms that are fitted with 
only electro-optical sensors have to utilize the radar inputs from the coastal defense 
network in order to be integrated into this network.     
In July 2006, a senior Israeli navy officer told CNN, that “there have been 80 
maritime terror plots that Israel has detected over the years and most of them have 
been foiled, since Israel has established an elaborate network of early warning 
devices to monitor the threats from the sea.”52 
D.  CONDITIONALITY   
If Israel has been able to enhance its MST in and around the territorial 
waters, then why has not this concept, especially the utilization of the AIS for 
increasing the probability of identification, been incorporated by other nations as 
well? Could there be a conditionality that needs to be satisfied for pragmatically 
implementing the concept of utilizing the AIS with radar for enhancing Maritime 
Space Transparency? Many countries, including the United States, are considering 
the fitment of AIS on small boats as well.   
While many organizations are involved in port security — from 
private firms to local authorities — is it ultimately the U.S. Coast 
Guard’s responsibility. “We’ve taken a series of steps to reduce 
vulnerability and I think we’ve got to keep going in that direction,” 
U.S. Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen said. The service in 
December published a “notice of proposed rule making” that would 
require commercially operated craft more than 65 feet long and 
vessels transporting more than 50 people to carry the Automatic 
Identification System  —  a communication transponder that 
identifies a vessel’s position, speed, destination and cargo. It is 
currently required only in craft weighing more than 300 gross 
tons.53   
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In addition to Israel, Singapore also has a very similar coastal defense 
concept, which amalgamates the inputs from the radar and AIS, and also utilizes 
electro-optical sensors for further classification of certain contacts. Importantly, 
the fitment of AIS is currently compulsory for all vessels including small crafts, in 
the territorial waters of Singapore and also in the Singapore Straits.  These 
transponders are called Harbor Craft Transponder System (HARTS) and they 
automatically send the vessel’s identification, position, course and speed to port 
authority.   
Singapore will require small harbor and pleasure craft to be fitted 
with transponders as part of security measures to counter terror 
and piracy threats, the Maritime and Port Authority (MPA) said 
Friday, July 1, 2005. The MPA said the Harbor Craft Transponder 
System (HARTS) has been developed for use by smaller vessels 
outside the coverage of security rules mandated by the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) which covers bigger 
ships. The transponders will enable the vessels to transmit their 
identity, position, course and speed to authorities onshore. They 
will also contain a 'panic button' to alert land-based authorities in 
the event of a security threat.54 
The ranges of the AIS, radar and optical sights are limited to line of sight; 
therefore, setting up coastal defense based on these systems would require a 
large number of such coastal sensors for countries with longer coastline. Since 
Israel and Singapore have limited coastlines, these countries have been able to 
establish such good coastal defense systems with enhanced MST. The extent of 
the coastline and / or the maritime space in terms of square nautical miles 
therefore is an environmental variable, when attempting to enhance the MST. 
According to the historic analysis of maritime terrorism in Israel, analysis of 
Israeli coastal defense and the corroboratory evidence of Singapore harbor; it 
can be summarized that MST for coastal defense in and around the territorial 
waters can be enhance by amalgamating the radar (for detection), AIS (for 
identification), and day and night electro-optical sight (for further classification) 
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inputs, by networking these sensors. While undertaking coastal defense with 
such sensors, the extent of the coastline and / or size of the maritime space 
would be vital environmental conditions. The available technologies, which could 
be adapted to enhance the MST around longer coastlines and in larger areas, 


















IV. MARITIME SPACE TRANSPARENCY   
A.  LARGE MARITIME SPACE   
As detailed in the previous chapter, Maritime Space Transparency in and 
around the territorial waters in order to effectively counter the threat of small boat 
terrorism, has been enhanced by few nations including Israel and Singapore. The 
primary means of detection and identification utilized by these countries include 
coastal surveillance radar, such as Elta System’s EL/M – 2226,55 and AIS56 
respectively. The coastal surveillance radars, like Elta System’s EL/M – 2226, 
are optimized for detecting small boats, and therefore operate in “X” Band radar 
frequency (8 -12 GHz).57 The AIS as mandated by the International Maritime 
Organization with an effective date of 31 December 2004, on all ships of 300 
tons and more, operates on the VHF radio frequency (30 – 300 MHz). “The AIS 
is a shipboard broadcast system that acts like a transponder, operating in the 
VHF maritime band that is capable of handling well over 4,500 reports per minute 
and updates as often as every two seconds.”58  The limitation of both these 
systems is their Line of Sight ranges; therefore, even if the power of these 
systems was increased their ranges would still be limited to the horizon. The 
radar detection range depends upon many factors, such as transmitter power 
output, receiver sensitivity, beam forms, antenna type, signal processing, 
atmospheric conditions, etc; however, the horizon range is a major criterion while 
establishing the maximum achievable range of the radar.  
Under standard atmospheric conditions, the radar beam tends to 
bend slightly downward, and the distance, d, of the radar horizon is 
given by the formula: 
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d (in n miles) = 1.22 √h (in feet) or 
 
d (in n miles) = 2.21 √h (in meters),  
 
where h is the height of the antenna in feet or meters. 
 
Thus, the theoretical radar horizon range based purely on the antenna and 
the target heights is given by the formula:  
 
Rd = 1.22 √h (ft) + 1.22 √H (f) or 
 
Rd = 2.21 √h (m) + 2.21 √H (m), 
 
where, h and H are the heights of the antenna and targets respectively in 
feet or meters. In both cases Rd is the theoretical detection range in 
nautical miles.  
 
This relationship is theoretical since it assumes: 
 
 Standard atmospheric conditions. 
 Radar pulses are sufficiently powerful. 
 Target response characteristics are such as to return detectable 
response.  
 Weather condition, such as precipitation, etc., through which the 







Figure 11.   RADAR HORIZON RANGE  
                                            





The horizon range thus depends upon the target and antenna heights. 
Since the target height is not a controllable variable, the horizon range can only 
be increased by increasing the height of the antenna.  The concept of covering a 
larger maritime space by increasing the height of the antenna in order to 
enhance the horizon range has been and is being utilized in the maritime 
environment by positioning coastal surveillance radars on hilltops and also by 
deploying aircrafts for maritime reconnaissance. Both these options have certain 
drawbacks, if they need to be utilized for maintaining continuous surveillance in 
time and spatial domains. The topography of the coastline may not always have 
the hill of the desired heights at required distance to provide in-depth coverage of 
maritime space with sufficient inter radar overlap. Therefore, the concept of 
positioning radar on hilltops may be a good option for limited coastline 
surveillance in hilly coastal terrain, but may not be viable for covering longer 
coastline with flat topography. Regarding the utilization of aircraft for increasing 
the antenna height, there are many recommended searches and patrols for 
maritime reconnaissance based on various operational analysis methods, but all 
these can only provide near-continuous coverage in time and spatial domains 
due to the mobile nature of this platform. Though one can argue that the option of 
increasing the number of aircrafts for providing continuous coverage always 
exists, this option would not be economically viable for continuously monitoring 
large maritime space 24 hours a day, every week, year-round (24/7/365). To 
have continuous coverage in time and spatial domains of a larger maritime 
space, with respect to what the coastal stations can cover, a stationary aerial 
platform would be a preferred option.  For an aerial platform to be stationary with 
respect to a particular point on earth, it either has to be tethered to the ground or 
its orbit must be synchronous with the rotation of the earth. Based on the existing 
technology, an aerostat and / or a geosynchronous satellite could be the two 




B. DETECTION   
1.  Aerostat  
Aerostat are large balloons, which are made lighter than air using helium 
to stay aloft and are tethered to the ground with a cable that can also provide 
power. A variant of an aerostat is an airship, which is traditionally manned and 
uses engines to fly. Since enhancing the transparency of larger maritime space 
continuously in time and space domain require stationary aerial platform, the 
airship will not be further discussed. Historically, aerostats have been utilized and 
are being utilized for military surveillance over land; their use along the coast for 




Figure 12.   TACTICAL AEROSTAT  
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The most well established LTA platform today is the Tethered 
Aerostat Radar System (TARS) that has been operating since 1980 
along the southern United States border and in the Caribbean. 
Currently, TARS’ primary mission is surveillance for drug 
interdiction. Each aerostat can lift 2,200 lbs of sensors to a height 
of 12,000 feet, and can detect targets out to 230 miles. The 
aerostat can stay aloft for months. In response to on-going threats 
to U.S. troops deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army has 
deployed small aerostats, equipped with ground surveillance 
sensors, to those countries. The Rapidly Elevated Aerostat 
Platform (REAP) was jointly developed by the Navy and the Army. 
This 25-foot long aerostat is much smaller than TARS, and 
operates at 300 feet above the battlefield. It is designed for rapid 
deployment and carries daytime and night vision cameras. The 
Army has also reportedly deployed a Rapid Aerostat Initial 
Development (RAID) system to Afghanistan. This aerostat is 
approximately twice the size of REAP and operates at 
approximately 1,000 feet. It also carries a suite of day and night 
cameras for force protection. RAID is a spinoff of the Joint Land 
Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor System 
(JLENS) program.60 
Presently, tethered Aerostats are fitted with surveillance and 
communication suites; to provide low-level radar surveillance, wider optical 
surveillance and communication relay capability. The United States has deployed 
aerostats along its southern border in the states of Arizona, New Mexico, Texas 
and Florida to provide low-level radar surveillance data in support of federal 
agencies involved in the nation's drug interdiction program.61 Additionally, these 
aerostats also provide “the North American Aerospace Defense Command with 
low-level surveillance coverage for air sovereignty in the Florida Straits.”62  ILC 
Dover and Tethered Communications L.P. have manufactured these aerostats, 
and they are fitted with Lockheed Martin radar. These aerostats are capable of  
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carrying payloads of 1,200–2,200 pounds up to 15,000 feet. The radar horizon 
range of the aerostats for a four-feet height target based upon the formulae 
discussed would be: 
Rd  = 1.22 √h (ft) + 1.22 √H (f) 
  = 1.22 √15000 + 1.22 √4 
  = 151.5 nautical miles at aerostat height of 15,000 feet 
  = 136.1 nautical miles at aerostat height of 12,000 feet       
Considering these radar horizon ranges, a single tethered aerostat fitted 
with surveillance radar at a height of 15,000 feet, can cover a coastline of more 
than 300 nautical miles and provide all around maritime surveillance to a 
distance of more than 150 nautical miles against a four-foot high target. 
Traditionally, aerostats have always been considered a fair weather asset, but a 
modern aerostat at 15,000 feet can operate in winds of more than 60 knots, and 
can be hauled in or out within half an hour.  
Modern aerostat can lift a payload of greater than 3000 pounds 
(1364 kg) to altitudes of 15,000 ft (4.5 km) or more above sea level. 
They can operate in winds in excess of 60 knots (111 km/hr), and 
can survive winds substantially in excess of this value while moored 
on the ground. Winch systems and aerostat pressurizing systems 
have been developed that permit inhaul and outhaul at rates in 
excess of 600 feet per minute (183 meters/ minute). Launch and 
recovery operations are largely automated, but are normally 
monitored by a flight controller who can override the automated 
system.63  
If the weather conditions obviate the deployment of aerostat, such 
conditions would also severely affect the survivability of small boats at sea and in 
turn hamper the mission of small boat terrorists.  Additionally, if strong 
intelligence is available on some small boat terror activity, then the short absence 
of the tethered aerostat in very bad weather could be substituted with maritime 
aircraft search and / or patrol by ships. “Blowdown” is another limitation of 
tethered aerostats. “All tethered balloons are subject to “blowdown,” a term that 
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refers to the downward excursion from the ground tether point. Blowdown can be 
considerable (two nautical miles or more) for high-altitude aerostats in high 
winds.”64  This drawback of a tethered aerostat can also be easily corrected by 
incorporating the requisite position correction by installing a GPS onboard the 
aerostat. Therefore, notwithstanding the limitations of tethered aerostat, these 
platforms can very effectively be utilized for monitoring large maritime space. 
2.  Satellites  
It is unquestionably the best solution to utilize geosynchronous satellites to 
monitor large maritime space continuously in time and spatial domains; but these 
satellites are positioned 22,300 miles (35,900 km) above the equator. These 
satellites because of their heights are primarily used for weather forecasting, 
satellite television, satellite radio and other types of global communications; with 
the existing technologies it is not feasible to detect ships at sea utilizing the 
geosynchronous satellites. However, the efficacy of utilizing Low Earth Orbit 
(LEO) satellites could still be considered, as a great deal of research on utilizing 
a constellation of these types of satellites for maritime surveillance is underway.  
When the interest goes well beyond one’s own restricted coastal 
waters and covers broader ocean regions or indeed becomes 
global then the use of space borne sensor is indispensable.  For an 
all weather capability and with a resolution of some 10-20 meters 
which is independent of range, the sensor to be used would be 
synthetic aperture radar (SAR). SAR satellites typically orbit the 
earth in 100 minutes, while the earth is rotating with a speed of 15 
degree/hour. This means that the successive satellite passes drift 
westward by 25 degree and that the coverage (in terms of average 
number of useful orbit per day) at a given location by one single 
satellite will be quite small, and totally dependent on the swath 
width of the SAR applications requiring frequent visits to a given 
area of some size would necessitate the use of multiple satellites 
which could be very costly. Table 2, shows the coverage capability 
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(average number of useful satellite passes per day) at three 
different latitudes for swath widths of 100, 200 and 400 km:65 
 
 Swath Width (Km) 
 100 200 400 
0 0.07 0.14 0.28 




65 0.18 0.36 0.72 
Table 2.   LOW EARTH ORBIT SATELLITE SAR SWATH WIDTH (FROM 
PRINCIPLES OF INTEGRATED MARITIME SURVEILLANCE 
SYSTEM)   
But even if a desired coverage of a fixed location can be achieved, there is 
a possibility of objects going undetected because they can move out of the area 
of interest before the satellite comes. One therefore has to compare the sweep 
width with the speed of the moving objects. Table 3, shows the time needed to 
move across a swath of 100, 200 or 400 Km width at speed of 1, 4 or 16 knots:66 
 
 Swath Width (Km) 
 100 200 400 
16 3.5 h 6.9 h 14 h 




1 56 h 111 h 222 h 
Table 3.   LEO SATELLITE SAR SWATH WIDTH V/S TARGET SPEED 
(FROM PRINCIPLES OF INTEGRATED MARITIME 
SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM)   
It can be observed from Table 2 that the coverage values at the equator 
and mid latitude are very similar, but they increase rapidly at higher latitudes. 
This data implies that at 35 degree latitude, a satellite with 200 km swath width 
synthetic aperture radar would only be able to cover a 200 km wide area out of 
the 1111 km wide maritime space once a day, and in order to cover this wide 
maritime space once a day, at least six such satellites would be required. While a 
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wider swath width to reduce the number of satellites would be preferable from a 
coverage point of view, this would compromise the detection capability of 
synthetic aperture radar satellite. The number of satellites needed to cover a 
1111 km-wide maritime space every day might look alarming, but in this 
configuration a constellation of six satellites in the same orbital plane would be 
able to cover almost the whole earth at 35 degree latitude once every day, as the 
adjacent 911 km gap out of the 1111 km would be equally covered by the 
remaining five satellites in the same orbital plane. It can also be observed from 
Table 3 that a revisit time of less than 14 hours is required to prevent an object 
crossing a swath width of 400 km undetected. Accordingly, if a greater number of 
such satellites is positioned in a different orbital plane in a constellation of SAR 
LEO satellites in order to reduce the revisit time of the desired maritime space to 
less than 14 hours then a vessel steaming at less than 16 knots cannot travel a 
distance of more than 400 km without being detected. Alternatively, if the swath 
width of the satellite constellation is increased, then also the revisit time of such 
satellites can be increased to 24 hours for the same requirement of target speed.  
Therefore, although a constellation of synthetic aperture radar low earth orbit 
satellites in a configuration to cover the complete earth once a day may not be 
able to provide continuous detection capability for the desired maritime space, it 
can certainly enhance the overall MDA capability. 
In December 2007, MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates Ltd, (MDA), 
Canada, launched RADARSAT-2, which provides the world's most advanced 
commercially available C-band radar imagery. RADARSAT-2 is an important new 
data source of global geospatial intelligence. It offers very specific capabilities, 
the advantages of multi-polarized Synthetic Aperture Radar, and applications of 
its specialized image products for defense and intelligence communities. 
RADARSAT-2 data has significant potential to play a key role in support of 




improves ship detection and, in combination with fully polarimetric (Quad-Pol) 
data, offers the potential for ship classification. Figure 13, shows a port scene 
with ship detection and classification.67 
 
 
Figure 13.   RADARSAT PICTURE  
Based on the performance of the RADARSAT-1 and RADARSAT-2, 
Canada has planned to launch a constellation of LEO satellites fitted with SAR, 
called the RADARSAT Constellation Mission (RCM). The first satellite of this 
constellation is scheduled to be launched in 2012. In addition to the SAR, these 
satellites would also be fitted with AIS receiver.   
The successor (and complementary) mission to RADARSAT-2 will 
be the RADARSAT Constellation Mission (RCM), consisting of 
three (small) spacecraft. The overall objective of RCM is to provide 
C-band SAR data continuity for the RADARSAT-2 users, as well as 
adding a new series of applications enabled through the 
constellation approach. The SAR imagery is required by various 
Canadian government users at frequent revisit rates (high temporal 
resolution). The main uses of the RCM data are expected to be in 
the areas of maritime surveillance/security, including ship detection, 
and resource management. The three-satellite configuration will 
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provide complete coverage of Canada's land and oceans offering 
an average daily revisit at 50 m resolution, as well as a significant 
coverage of international areas for Canadian and international 
users. It will also offer average daily access to 95% of the world. 
The satellites will be interoperable, enabling tasking from one 
satellite to the next and will be equally spaced in a 600 km low 
earth orbit. The constellation has a flexible design, allowing up to 
six satellites to fly in the same plane.68  
If LEO satellite constellation is restricted only to SAR, then the processing time 
depending upon resolution may take hours for the MDA to provide actionable 
intelligence. However, if AIS’s receiver is also fitted onboard such satellites and 
the data of both these sensors is fused together, then certainly actionable 
intelligence to guide other platforms, such as aircraft and UAV, can be generated 
from these MDA inputs. 
C.  AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM  
Automatic Identification Systems are fitted on ships above 300 tons for 
automatic identification and navigational safety; these systems electronically 
exchange data with other ships and shore Vessel Traffic System (VTS). Post-
9/11, the International Maritime Organization mandated the fitment of this system 
on all ships of 300 tons and above by 31 December 2004 to counter the threat of 
maritime terrorism.69 This system automatically broadcasts the ships information, 
including its identity, position, course, speed, rate of turn, destination, estimated 
time of arrival (ETA) at destination, time of report and various other navigational 
information, at regular interval via a VHF transmitter.   
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Figure 14.   AIS SOTDMA DEPICTION   
The AIS utilizes Self Organized Time Division Multiple Access (SOTDMA) 
technology to automatically form networks between ships and others receivers 
and this obviates the chances of data collision between various transmissions. 
The TDMA part of the technology divides the transmissions into 2250 time slots 
every 60 seconds on two different predetermined VHF frequencies, thereby 
providing 4500 time slots every minute.70 The self-organized capability allows 
each transmitter to automatically determine its transmission slot based upon the 
transmission history and predicted slot allocation. These systems continuously 
synchronize themselves with each other to prevent the overlap or collision of 
data from different transmitters. In this way, when within VHF radio range of each 
other new stations automatically keep joining the network and the slots of the old 
stations are reallocated. However, in the case of contact overload in a single 
network, contacts further away are dropped to give preference to closer ones. 
Therefore, though the capacity of the system may appear to be 4500 stations, 
but practically it is unlimited, allowing the formation of numerous networks. In 
order to further optimize this system vessels that are stationary and movingly 
slowly transmit less frequently than those that are moving faster or are 
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maneuvering. Vital information like identity, position, course and speed are 
transmitted every 2–10 seconds depending upon the vessel speed and every 
three minutes for stationary stations, and the additional information is 
broadcasted every six minutes. AIS information can be displayed on an 
electronic chart, as shown in Figure 15.   
            
Figure 15.   AIS TRACKS ON ECDIS    
As can be observed from Figure 15, the identity and various other information is 
displayed in the bottom right window. Alternatively, the picture can also be 
displayed with the name of the vessels being displayed adjacent to the track on 
the electronic map. Since the data is in an electronic format, it can also be fused 
with the output of the radar; and the contacts detected on radar as not having an 
AIS response could be displayed as red color tracks, instead of green color for 
tracks with both the responses.      
1. Automatic Identification System on Small Boats 
The Boat Owners Association of the United States has slammed 
proposals from the U.S. House of Representatives Coast Guard 
Committee for airplane transponders to be fitted to millions of small 
vessels to prevent waterborne attacks. Boat U.S., in its December 
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9, 2009 address to the body, said that fitting transponders, similar 
to those used in aviation for monitoring by air traffic control towers, 
was not a practical idea and would do little to mitigate terrorism or 
piracy. Marine Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) have long 
been used as a collision avoidance tool for commercial ships and 
provides important vessel identification, position, speed and course 
information to fellow mariners as well as land-based vessel traffic 
control systems. Since 9/11, the Coast Guard has been tasked by 
the Department of Homeland Security to develop a small boat 
threat assessment and strategy to reduce the possibility of small 
watercraft being used by terrorists. “The challenge with AIS is that it 
does not provide the ability to reduce the small boat threat,” said 
Boat U.S. Vice President of Government Affairs, Margaret Podlich. 
“Even if a would-be terrorist would go to the trouble of complying 
with an AIS requirement, they would merely have to pull the AIS 
unit’s electrical plug moments before the attack,” Podlich reasoned. 
She also mentioned a terrorist could simply steal a boat. “AIS does 
not recognize if people aboard a vessel are on a watch list.” In 
addition, AIS can be easily “spoofed,” or manipulated to make 
every AIS transponder in a certain area report inaccurate data, she 
concluded.71 
As can be noted from the above citation, the fitment of AIS on small boats 
for countering the threat of terrorism is being deliberated in various forums. The 
major concern of these deliberations is that terrorists definitely would not transmit 
their identity, as they always exploit the information advantage to overcome the 
force advantage. This concern could be divided into three logical issues that 
need to be addressed when utilizing this system to counter terrorists. First, what 
if the terror boat does not comply with the fitment of the AIS or switches off this 
system? Second, what if the terrorists spoof their boat’s identity as some other 
friendly boat? Last, what if terrorists utilize a hijacked friendly boat? The first 
issue of detecting boats not transmitting on the AIS can be resolved by fusing the 
outputs of the radar and AIS. Thus, a contact detected on radar without AIS 
output becomes alarming and would require further investigation. As mentioned 
earlier, an example of this could be a change in the color of the tracks between 
                                            
71  Mike Godfrey, U.S. Boat Association Reproaches Small Boat Tracking Proposals, 
December 16, 2009, http://www.tax-news.com/asp/story/story_marine.asp?storyname=40704 
(accessed March 02, 2010). 
 61
red and green on electronic charts based on data fusion of the radar and AIS 
outputs. The second and third issues are the most complicated, but can be 
resolved by maintaining a real-time database of all friendly contacts at sea, 
wherein it is mandatory for all friendly units proceeding to sea to log into this 
database based on security token, pass phrase and geographic location based 
multi-factor authentication, and then follow a precommitted schedule. An 
example of this would be, every vessel fitted with AIS leaving certain harbor 
would have to commit to a certain route or area of operation by logging into the 
real-time database of friendly contacts system by smart card, password based 
encryption key and its GPS based geographic location. Now, if the terrorists try to 
spoof the identity of some friendly boat that is not logged into this real-time 
database, then the spoofed contact would be indicated as hostile. Likewise, if 
they spoof the identity of an already logged-in contact, then both the contacts 
become suspect. Additionally, if the logged in contacts do not follow their 
precommitted schedule of a route or an area, then these contacts also become 
suspicious. Such suspicious contacts would also be displayed as red color 
tracks. The system could also be provided with an emergency alarm button to 
report a hijacking or threat, and thus would also function in the manner of a 
friendly neighborhood-watch alarm. This system would function like information 
nodes operating from a fleet of friendly fishing boat reporting suspicious contacts.   
If the decision is made to fit the AIS on small boats in order to enhance 
MST, then the next logical question is: can all vessels, irrespective of their size, 
which would also include small sail boats, rubberized outboard motor fitted boats, 
oar-boats, etc., be fitted with this system? No logical solution to this problem has 
so far been answered, and thus, the mandate of International Maritime 
Organization for fitting of AIS on all ships of 300 tons and above is the last policy 
decision on this issue.72 In order to enhance the MST, and also to resolve all 
issues regarding the fitment of this system; this thesis proposes a role-based 
fitment policy for the AIS, as opposed to the existing size based policy. This 
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would imply that fitment of the AIS should be mandatory for all vessels 
proceeding outside the contiguous zone or territorial sea (in the absence of 
contiguous zone) irrespective of the size of the vessel. The limit of territorial 
waters and contiguous zone has been recommended, as it is only in the former 
that a country exercises sovereign jurisdiction and in the latter that country 
exercises the control necessary to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, 
immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea, in 
accordance with the United Nations Convention on the law of the Sea.73 A policy 
like this would ensure that very small vessels, which due to the nature of their 
role, do not cross the contiguous zone or territorial sea (in the absence of 
contiguous zone) of a country into the international sea would be exempted from 
fitment of the AIS. These are also those vessels, like small sail boats, rubberized 
outboard motor fitted boats, oar-boats, etc, which due to the nature of their 
construction do not permit the promulgation of a policy for mandatory fitment of 
AIS on all vessels at sea. However, an identification zone of 40–80 nautical 
miles, accounting for an interception capability of 2–4 hours against a 20 knots 
target, would have to be ensured outside the contiguous zone to permit 
exempting the fitment of identification equipment on vessels operating in the 
territorial waters and contiguous zone. Countries sharing the limit of their 
territorial waters could mutually work out an identification zone on either side of 
this limit based on their enforcement capability.   
2. AIS’s Aerial Monitoring  
When shuttle astronauts Michael Foreman and Randolph Bresnik 
flew to the International Space Station during Thanksgiving last 
year (2009), they attached an Automatic Identification System 
antenna to the Columbus laboratory so the European Space 
Agency could begin testing a pair of AIS receivers for use in 
tracking global maritime traffic from space. An AIS antenna was 
installed on the International Space Station late last year to test 
vessel tracking from space. Designed to pick up signals from 
standard shipboard AIS transponders, satellite-based AIS promises 
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to add a new dimension to maritime security and vessel tracking by 
extending ship-to-shore AIS coverage from the coast to the oceans. 
AIS were developed for collision avoidance and vessel-traffic 
management in busy ports and along coastal shipping routes, and 
until recently, it was terrestrial-based only. Ship transponders send 
VHF signals ship to ship and from ships to coastal towers and 
buoys, their range limited to line of sight — typically 20 to 40 
nautical miles, depending on antenna height. Satellite-based AIS is 
feasible because VHF signals can travel the 400 or so miles into 
space to reach a low-Earth-orbiting satellite. The satellite receives 
the signal, and then forwards it to a ground station. From orbit, an 
AIS receiver has a range of more than 1,000 nautical miles in any 
direction to the Earth’s horizon. Dana Goward, director of the U.S. 
Coast Guard’s assessment, integration and risk management 
office, the man who oversees the agency’s vessel-tracking 
capabilities, says the U.S. Coast Guard already is using satellite-
based AIS to collect information about vessels around the world, 
though the coverage is neither continuous nor worldwide. U.S.  
Coast Guard buys its coverage from Orbcomm of Fort Lee, N.J., 
the only commercial provider of satellite-based AIS, with two AIS-
equipped satellites in orbit. That soon will change. Between now 
and 2012, Orbcomm plans to launch 18 more satellites with VHF 
data communication capabilities, including receiving and forwarding 
AIS. Orbcomm’s satellites circle the globe every 100 minutes. Once 
its constellation of 18 AIS satellites is in place, the company will be 
able to deliver AIS reports from a particular ship every 15 minutes, 
says Orbcomm CEO Marc Eisenberg.74   
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Figure 16.   WORLDWIDE AIS TRACKS     
Figure 16 is a worldwide AIS plot of over 15,000 contacts, as observed by 
ORBCOMM satellites over 24 hours. A Norwegian Defense Research 
Establishment study had analyzed, the ship detection probability for a space-
based AIS system with a ship reporting interval of 6 sec, and had calculated that 
a single satellite at 1000 km altitude will be able to handle up to 900 ships within 
the field of view with a ship detection probability of better than 99%.    
AIS signals can easily be detected from space by a standard AIS 
receiver for altitudes up to 1000 km. However, an AIS sensor in 
space would cover a much larger area on the ground than the AIS 
system was originally designed for. With many ships within the field 
of view, interference problems will occur and AIS messages from 
some of the ships may not be detected. Detailed analyses of the 
ship detection probability have been performed. Important 
parameters for the ship detection probability were found to be; the 
reporting interval ΔT, the observation time Tobs, and the number of 
ships within the field of view. A single satellite at 1000 km altitude 
(Tobs=15 min) would be able to handle up to 900 ships within the 
field of view with a ship detection probability of better than 99%, 
with a ship reporting interval of ΔT=6 s.75 
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Depending on traffic density, the capability of the AIS-based satellite 
constellation to handle a larger number of ships can be increased by increasing 
the number of satellites, lowering the height of the satellite, increasing the 
reporting interval and / or increasing the observation time. Aerial based AIS is 
capable of providing ship detection capability of more than 99% at 1000 km, if the 
number of ships does not exceed its maximum capacity of target handling. 
Therefore, a constellation of 18 LEO satellites would be able to provide an 
update of every ship across the globe every 15 minutes, but would still not be 
able to provide continuous identification capability in time domain for establishing 
MST. However, if the same LEO satellites are fitted with both SAR and AIS, then 
these satellites can definitely provide near-real MST.    
D. LARGE MARITIME SPACE TRANSPARENCY 
Today, the ranges of AIS, which as per design were to operate within 20–
40 nautical miles, have been witnessed to extend more than 400 nautical miles 
into space. A tethered aerostat at 15,000 feet fitted with a sensor suite of radar, 
AIS, and an electro-optical sensor and IR camera, thus can provide enhanced 
transparency in maritime space of more than 150 nautical mile radius. As, AIS is 
capable of providing more than 99% ship detection capability depending on the 
traffic density 1000 km into space; this system fitted onboard an aerostat at 
15,000 feet thus would also provide 99% probability of intercepting ships' 
transmissions up to its maximum capacity of 4500 ship. As outlined earlier, if 
there are more than 4500 contacts, those which are further away would 
automatically be dropped. AIS, along with real-time database of vessels at sea 
and their precommitted schedule compliance (to prevent spoofing), would 
provide more than 99% probability of identification of the closest 4500 contacts. 
Defining a type of radar, such as frequency band, signal processing and various 
other parameters that contribute towards its probability of detection is not 




aerostat radars with more than 90% probability of detection against a 5 m2 target 
at more than 150 miles, particulars of Northrop Grumman's aerostat based-radar 
AN/TPS-63 (S) are stated below:  
When modified for aerostat use, the TPS-63 radar is reported as 
being designated as the AN/TPS-63(S) or -63M(S) 'strap modified 
aerostat' equipment. As an aerostat radar, the sensor is understood 
to offer a 90 per cent likelihood of detecting a 5 m2 (53.8 sq ft) 
target (flying at an altitude and range of 150 m (481 ft) and 260 km 
(161.6 miles) respectively) within a single scan when being 
operated from an altitude of between 915 m (3,000 ft) and 3,050 m 
(10,000 ft).76 
Since aerostats historically have been utilized for detecting low-flying aircrafts 
and / or missiles, the majority of existing aerostat radars are primarily designed 
for this role. Nevertheless, these radars can still be utilized for maritime 
detection, although it would be prudent to fit radar with more than 90% probability 
of detection against small maritime targets for MST. According to the exhibits and 
explanations in the previous two chapters, it can be summarized that an aerostat 
fitted with a sensor suite of radar (90% p (det)) and AIS (99% p (identification)), 
at 15,000 feet, can provide: 
Maritime Space Transparency  = p (detection) x p (identification)  
(around 150 nautical miles)  
     = .9 x .99 
     = 89.1 % for less than 4500 contacts,  
if AIS spoofing can be obviated by maintaining a real-time database of vessels at 
sea, and their compliance to precommitted schedule is ensured.   
Additionally, if the aerostats are fitted with electro-optical and IR camera 
for providing day and night visual identification, the contacts that have been 
detected but not identified could be classified to further enhance MST. This visual 
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identification capability would also ensure further classification of suspected 
contacts based on the rules to prevent AIS spoofing. 
E.  MULTICRITERIA OPTIMIZATION    
The number of aerostats required to provide transparency in the desired 
maritime space would also depend upon the number of targets in the area in 
addition to the horizon range of aerostats. The number of aerostats, while 
maintaining Maritime Space Transparency of more than 89%, therefore, would 
be optimized with Multi-criteria optimization, as this process simultaneously 
optimizes two or more criteria subject to certain constraints. The process of 
optimizing the number of aerostats is explained in the succeeding paragraphs. 
1. Assumptions 
The following have been assumed: 
 The targets are randomly distributed in the desired maritime space. 
 Both the criteria of horizon range and number of contacts are 
equally important, as the probability of detection depends upon the 
former, probability of identification on both, and Maritime Space 
Transparency is the multiple of both these probabilities. 
 Aerostat radar horizon range of 150 nautical miles for an aerostat 
height of 15,000 feet, the radar horizon range calculation on Page 
47 refers. 
 All aerostats at same height of 15,000 feet. 
2. Decision Variable 
Let  x  = number of aerostat. 
3. Optimization 
Let r = horizon range of aerostat. 
  d = desired inter aerostat distance.  
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  e = effective range of aerostat. 
  c = total coastline. 
  t = total number of targets. 
  cc = coastline coverage factor, 
    (coastline that can be covered by aerostats 
    / total coastline). 
  tc = target coverage factor, 
    (targets that can be covered by aerostats 
    / total number of targets). 








Figure 17.   INTER AEROSTAT SPACING 
In order to have continuous coverage of area s x 2s, where s is the 
side of the square within the horizon range (r) of an aerostat, adjacent aerostats 
would have to be positioned at a distance d (desired inter aerostat distance), as 
shown in Figure 17. 
d  = s, from Figure 17  
   = √ (r^2 + r^2), since the triangle is a right angled  








b. Weighted Multiple Criteria Optimization 
In mathematical terms, solution of weighted multiple criteria 
optimization would be written as: 
  =  min (w 1 obj 1 + w 2 obj 2), 
          x 
   where obj i is the i-th objective function 
    w i is the weight of i-th objective function   
c. First Objective Function  
Objective function y1, minimize x based on horizon range of 
aerostat 
   = minimize cc, such that it is atleast 1 
   = minimize x * e * 2 / c, such that it is = > 1 
   = minimize x * d / c, such that it is = > 1 
   = minimize (x * √ (r^2 + r^2)), such that it is = > 1  
d. Second Objective Function  
Objective function y2, minimize x based on total number of targets 
   = minimize tc, such that it is at least 1 
   = minimize x * 4500 / t, such that it is = > 1, 
    since a single aerostat can receive a  
    maximum of 4500 targets   
e. Optimum Number of Aerostats 
The optimum numbers of aerostats, while maintaining Maritime 
Space Transparency of more than 89%, by weighted multiple criteria optimization 
would be: 
   = min (w 1 obj 1 + w 2 obj 2), 
             x 
 
   = min (.5 cc + .5 tc), such that cc and tc are = > 1 
      x 
 
    as both the criteria of horizon range and number of 
    contacts have been assumed to be equally 
    important based on the relationship of 
    probabilities. 
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The result of the above optimization, based upon the length of the coastline and 
maximum number of targets along this coastline by utilizing the solver function of 















(nm)  x r d    
200 4500 1 150 212.13 1.06 1.00 1.03 
300 4500 2 150 212.13 1.41 2.00 1.71 
400 4500 2 150 212.13 1.06 2.00 1.53 
500 4500 3 150 212.13 1.27 3.00 2.14 
        
400 9000 2 150 212.13 1.06 1.00 1.03 
500 9000 3 150 212.13 1.27 1.50 1.39 
600 9000 3 150 212.13 1.06 1.50 1.28 
700 9000 4 150 212.13 1.21 2.00 1.61 
        
700 13500 4 150 212.13 1.21 1.33 1.27 
800 13500 4 150 212.13 1.06 1.33 1.20 
900 13500 5 150 212.13 1.18 1.67 1.42 
1000 13500 5 150 212.13 1.06 1.67 1.36 
Table 4.    OPTIMUM NUMBER OF AEROSTATS TABLE 
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Figure 18.   OPTIMUM NUMBER OF AEROSTATS GRAPH 
As can be observed from Table 4 and Sub-para D of this chapter, three 
aerostats with appropriate sensors suite of radar (90% p (det)) and AIS (99% p 
(identification)), at 15,000 feet, can provide more than 89% MST along a 
coastline of up to 600 nautical miles for a maximum of 9000 AIS targets, by 
obviating AIS spoofing.  This capability of the coastal surveillance system could 
be assumed to be an absolute payoff of value 8 for the terror victim state in the 
Game Theory setup of Chapter II.  An absolute payoff of 8 has been assumed for 
the terror victim state based on 89% MST from the existing technologies because 
in the near future there could be more promising technologies that could further 
enhance the capability of maritime surveillance in territorial sea, thereby 
increasing this payoff to its maximum value of 9. Revisiting the analysis of the 
Game Theory in Chapter II, indicates that the security level of (5,2) without an 
effective coastal surveillance, could be increased to (8,2) by the terror victim 
state by enhancing its coastal surveillance against small boats utilizing optimum 
number of aerostats with an appropriate sensor suite. Though this still would not 
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be a Pareto optimum solution, it would place the terror victim state in a much 
more advantageous position to coerce the terror origin state to take action 
against the terrorist organizations operating from its territory. Even if the terror 
origin state does not act against the terrorist organizations, a security level payoff 
of 8 for the terror victim state achieved by enhancing coastal surveillance against 
small boats, would provide an excellent strategy against the small boat terror 








V. WAY AHEAD    
A. CONCLUSION     
In today’s information age, where information travels faster than a bullet: 
small boat terrorism in territorial sea has been transnationalized and 
revolutionized by the terrorists by exploiting commercially-available-off-the-shelf-
technologies like GPS, smart phones, satellite maps/charts/picture and Internet 
application like social networking, etc. It is now the turn of the counterterrorism 
security forces to utilize the speed of information to counter the bullets and 
bombs of these terrorists.  Tomorrow, there could still be more voices articulating 
better ways to counter the threat of small boat terrorism in territorial sea, but the 
strategy recommended by this thesis is akin to what Sun Tzu opined, “know your 
enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster.”77 
Although countering maritime terrorism by eliminating terrorists on land is 
unquestionably the better solution, as analyzed by Game theory the payoffs for 
offensive action against terrorists' base camps in another country would be very 
high financially and in terms of human resources. The preferred option for the 
country as per this analysis should be to utilize its MDA in the territorial sea to 
counter the threat of small boat terrorism in these waters.  According to a historic 
analysis of maritime terrorism in Israel, analysis of Israeli coastal defense, 
corroboratory evidence of Singapore harbor, and analysis of existing 
technologies, it can be summarized that attaching a network of optimum number 
of aerostats fitted with a sensor suite of radar, AIS, and  electro-optical sensor, 
together with the existing MDA, can provide enhanced transparency in large 
maritime space to counter threat of small boat terrorism in territorial waters. It is 
necessary, however, that the existing policy of AIS be amended to role based 
fitment and that the spoofing of these systems is obviated by maintaining a real-
time database of vessels at sea and ensuring their compliance to precommitted 
schedule. Additionally, the inputs of SAR and AIS from a constellation of LEO 
                                            
77  Sun Tzu, "The Art of War."  
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satellites could be utilized to augment the existing MDA, which would also assist 
in further enhancing the MST in the territorial sea. Concluding the thesis with 
Yarger’s  strategy model, which says  “strategy is all about how (way or concept) 
leadership will use the power (means or resources) available to the state to 
exercise control over sets of circumstances and geographic locations to achieve 
objectives (ends)”78, MDA can be adapted to the territorial sea, by incorporating 
a network of relevant sensors to enhance MST in order to reduce the information 
asymmetry between terrorists and maritime security forces, which would in turn  
provide actionable intelligence in the form of a Common Operating Picture (COP) 
to interdict small boat heading for terror attacks in these waters. 
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS  
It is undoubtedly true that the information age today has linked the 
terrorists across the continents, and thus to avoid the  possibility of small boat 
terror attacks, similar to the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, in future and against 
other countries, especially those combating terrorism, the following are 
recommended: 
 Role based AIS fitment policy. The present AIS fitment policy, 
which is based on the size of the vessel (above 300 tons) in 
accordance with International Maritime Organization,79 should be 
amended to a role-based policy, mandating the fitment of this 
equipment on vessels proceeding outside the contiguous zone or 
territorial sea (in the absence of contiguous zone) into the 
International Waters, irrespective of the size of the vessel.      
 Identification Zone. Promulgation of an identification zone of 40 – 
80 nautical miles outside the contiguous zone, catering for an 
intercept capability of 2 – 4 hours against a 20 knots target, in 
                                            
78  Harry R. Yarger, "Toward a Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the U.S. Army War College 
Strategy Model."  
79  IMO adopts comprehensive maritime security measures,  December 13, 2002.  
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which enhanced MST is maintained continuously in both time and 
spatial domain, in order to identify the suspected targets. Countries 
sharing the limit of their territorial waters could mutually work out 
the size of the identification zone either side of this limit based on 
their enforcement capability.  
 Real-time database of friendly contacts at sea. Maintenance of 
real-time data base of all friendly contacts at sea with self login 
capability based on security token (like, smart card), pass phrase 
(like, password based encryption key) and geographic location 
(like, GPS based position) based multi-factor authentication should 
be ensured to obviate AIS spoofing.  
 Compliance with precommitted schedule policy. Ensure the 
compliance of all vessels transiting in and out of the contiguous 
zone or territorial sea (in the absence of contiguous zone), to a 
precommitted schedule in order to identify suspected targets. 
 Emergency alarm function. Incorporation of an emergency alarm 
button in the AIS to provide immediate threat warning of incidents 
such as hijacking. This feature would also function as an early 
warning system from a fleet of friendly vessels operating in the 
International Waters outside the contiguous zone. 
 Aerostat based network of sensors. A network of an optimum 
number of aerostat fitted with a sensor suite of radar, AIS, and 
electro-optical and IR camera, should be amalgamated with the 
existing MDA to enhance MST  
 Space-based AIS. Orbcomm constellation of 18 VHF data capable 
LEO satellites, once operational in 2012, should be utilized to 
augment the worldwide MDA, as it would provide global AIS update 
of vessels every 15 minutes. Despite the fact that the present 
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update rate of AIS capable LEO satellites is far from desired, but 
their output still can be utilized for enhancing the existing MDA.   
 LEO satellites for detection and identification. While a 
constellation of LEO satellites fitted with SAR and AIS may not be 
able to provide continuous detection and identification capability in 
the time and spatial domains, but if this all weather global capability 
can be made near-continuous a constellation of such satellites 
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